



DEVELOPING THE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF ACADEMIC LYCEUM STUDENTS ON THE BASIS OF A COGNITIVE APPROACH

<https://doi.org/10.57033/mijournals-2026-4-0295>

Lobar NISHONOVA

*Independent Researcher, Tashkent State Pedagogical
University named after Nizami
Teacher, Academic Lyceum No. 1 of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan Tashkent, Uzbekistan
E-mail: lnishonova1991@gmail.com*

Received: 15-05-2026

Accepted: 28-05-2026

Published: 09-06-2026



Copyright: © 2026 by the authors.
Submitted for open access publication
under the terms and conditions of the
Creative Commons Attribution (CC
BY) license
([http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/))

Abstract. *This article examines the development of academic lyceum students' emotional intelligence through a cognitive approach. The ability model of emotional intelligence, the appraisal theory of emotion and the process model of emotion regulation are taken as the theoretical basis of the study. It is argued that the period from fifteen to eighteen years of age is particularly suitable for building the skill of cognitive reappraisal, and that the heavy workload and examination pressure characteristic of the academic lyceum environment make this skill correspondingly more necessary. The article sets out the logic by which cognitive techniques can be distributed across the four branches of emotional intelligence, and argues that such work is more effective when embedded in existing subjects than when delivered as a separate course. The limitations of available measurement instruments, the problem of cultural adaptation, and the risk that a cognitive approach may encourage excessive rationalisation of feeling are also discussed.*

Keywords: *emotional intelligence, cognitive approach, academic lyceum, cognitive reappraisal, emotion regulation, adolescence, emotional literacy, test anxiety, psychological and pedagogical model.*

INTRODUCTION

A student entering an academic lyceum undergoes several transitions at once. The peer group is new, the workload rises sharply, and a pupil who was first in the class a year earlier may now find themselves in the middle of a cohort of equally capable students. Beyond that lies the university entrance examination, which both the family and the student themselves usually regard as decisive.

Under such conditions the quality of education is not determined by the volume of knowledge alone. How a student experiences fatigue, failure, competition and self-

doubt bears directly on what they are able to learn. In psychology the set of abilities involved is known as emotional intelligence.

The concept entered the scientific literature in 1990, when its authors defined it as the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide thinking and action (Salovey & Mayer, 1990:189). The definition was subsequently reformulated as a four-branch model, and it is this model that predominates in current research (Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 2016:292).

That emotional intelligence is connected with educational outcomes no longer requires separate demonstration. A meta-analysis covering more than forty-two thousand students estimated the overall correlation between emotional intelligence and academic performance at $\rho = 0.20$, rising to $\rho = 0.24$ for measures based on the ability model (MacCann et al., 2020:150). One further finding of the same study deserves notice: after intelligence and conscientiousness, emotional intelligence emerged as the third most important predictor of achievement.

A clarification is needed here. A high level of emotional intelligence does not by itself produce high marks. The authors of the meta-analysis identify three mechanisms through which the association operates: the regulation of academic emotions, the building of social relationships at school, and a partial overlap between the content of certain subjects and emotional knowledge (MacCann et al., 2020:172). The effect, in other words, is mediated rather than direct – which matters for teaching practice, since intervention must be aimed at the mediating links.

The difficulty lies elsewhere. There is a considerable distance between acknowledging that emotional intelligence matters and developing it deliberately. In practice the task is usually left to pastoral hours, to general exhortation or to one-off training sessions whose effects are almost never measured. That gap defines the problem addressed here.

In Uzbek pedagogical literature the topic has become more prominent in recent years, but most contributions confine themselves to describing the concept and arguing for its importance. Systems of work that are tied to a specific age group, to a specific stage of education and to a single theoretical position remain rare. The academic lyceum stage deserves particular attention in this respect: its working regime differs both from the general secondary school and from higher education, and because entry is competitive, the student body presents a distinctive psychological profile.

The aim of this study is to identify the psychological and pedagogical foundations for developing academic lyceum students' emotional intelligence through a cognitive approach, and to set out the practical logic of that work. The choice of a cognitive approach is not arbitrary. It rests on the proposition that emotion arises not from an event as such but from the appraisal and interpretation placed upon it – a proposition that turns emotion into something that can be taught and altered.

Accordingly the article addresses the following tasks: to establish theoretically how emotional intelligence connects with the cognitive approach; to show, on the evidence of developmental psychology, why the period from fifteen to eighteen is suited to this work; to identify the specific emotional demands of the academic lyceum environment; to distribute cognitive techniques across the components of emotional intelligence; and to make explicit the limitations of assessment and implementation.

The working hypothesis may be stated as follows: the development of emotional intelligence in academic lyceum students yields more durable results when it is not organised as a series of separate sessions but embedded in the teaching process within a system that places cognitive reappraisal at its centre. The hypothesis draws on existing empirical evidence but has not been tested directly in national conditions, and is therefore presented as a theoretically grounded proposition rather than as an established finding.

The study uses descriptive-analytical and comparative methods. Its theoretical sources are the principal models of emotional intelligence, the appraisal theory of emotion, research on emotion regulation, and meta-analyses of the effectiveness of social and emotional learning in schools.

MAIN BODY

Any discussion of emotional intelligence must begin by specifying which model is meant, since three substantially different approaches travel under the same name. The first is the ability model, on which emotional intelligence is a form of intelligence comprising four branches: perceiving emotion, using emotion to facilitate thought, understanding emotion and managing emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997:10). The second is the mixed model, which incorporates personal qualities such as motivation, optimism and social skill (Goleman, 1995:43; Bar-On, 1997:16). The third is the trait model, which treats emotional intelligence as a constellation of self-perceptions located at the lower levels of personality (Petrides & Furnham, 2001:429).

The present article adopts the ability model. The reason is practical. Only this model presents emotional intelligence as a system of skills that can be taught and measured. The mixed and trait models lie close to personality characteristics, and these do not change over short periods. The meta-analysis cited above confirms the distinction: the strongest association with academic achievement was recorded precisely for performance-based tests built on the ability model (MacCann et al., 2020:161).

The relevance of the cognitive approach follows from a particular understanding of what emotion is. According to appraisal theory, emotion arises as a response not to a situation itself but to the person's evaluation of that situation (Lazarus, 1991:127). Two students may receive the same mark, yet one takes it as proof of incapacity and the other as an indication of a specific gap in preparation. The first is left with discouragement, the second with an unease that prompts action. One event, two emotions.

Scherer described this process in componential terms, showing that appraisal proceeds through a sequence of checks concerning relevance, implications, coping potential and normative significance (Scherer, 2009:1310). For education the value of such a description is that it breaks the emotional response into parts. What has been broken into parts can be discussed, analysed and changed.

A further feature of appraisal theory is especially convenient pedagogically. Appraisal need not be conscious; it usually runs automatically, which is why people so often experience their feelings as arising for no reason. Yet an automatic process can be made an object of conscious analysis. The central idea of Vygotsky's account is close to this: higher mental functions are first formed in external, joint activity and only later move to the internal plane (Vygotsky, 1978:57). Naming an emotional state aloud, then analysing it in writing, and finally performing the operation in inner speech is the practical expression of that transition.

The tradition of cognitive therapy converted the same idea into a working system. In Beck's cognitive model, emotional difficulty stems not from the event itself but from automatic thoughts and the stable beliefs behind them (Beck, 1976:82). Ellis's ABC scheme expresses the same logic more compactly: activating event, belief, consequence (Ellis, 1962:61). These schemes were developed for clinical purposes, but a simplified version can be used in an educational setting, where the issue is not treatment but the teaching of a thinking skill.

In the field of emotion regulation, Gross's process model is of particular importance. It distinguishes five families of strategy: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change and response modulation (Gross, 1998:283). These operate at different points in the emotional response and are not equally effective. A substantial body of research has shown that cognitive reappraisal is considerably more beneficial than suppression: the former reduces both the experience and the outward expression of emotion, whereas the latter blocks expression while leaving the internal strain intact (Gross, 2015:6). The distinction matters practically, because suppression is precisely what students are most often taught – advice such as “pull yourself together” or “be patient” belongs to that strategy.

Neuroimaging research has also clarified the mechanism of reappraisal at the level of the brain. During cognitive change, activity increases in prefrontal and cingulate regions while the amygdala response declines (Ochsner & Gross, 2005:245). This finding gives no direct instruction for classroom practice, but it does settle one point: reappraisal is not a matter of concealing emotion but a process that genuinely alters it. Explaining the mechanism to students in simplified form is therefore worthwhile, since a student who understands why a technique works applies it more consistently.

It is worth adding that the four branches do not develop evenly. Understanding and managing emotion are more closely tied to conventional cognitive ability, whereas

perception is comparatively independent of it. The point is not merely descriptive: it indicates where intervention is likely to repay effort, since the branches most amenable to instruction are also those that account for the largest share of the association with achievement once intelligence and personality are controlled.

We turn now to the question of age. Why the academic lyceum period in particular? Neuropsychological research shows that during adolescence the structures responsible for emotional response mature relatively early, while the prefrontal cortex responsible for executive control develops considerably later (Casey, Jones & Hare, 2008:114). Steinberg describes this as a temporary imbalance between two systems, and it is this imbalance that accounts for much of adolescent behaviour (Steinberg, 2005:71).

There are two ways of reading this evidence. The first leads to pessimism: if the prefrontal cortex is still immature, what is the point of teaching regulatory skills? The second reading points in the opposite direction. A system that is still forming is the system most open to external influence. Blakemore and Choudhury argue exactly this: adolescence is a period of heightened plasticity and therefore a favourable window for educational intervention (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006:305). Moreover, by fifteen to eighteen abstract reasoning is already in place, which allows a student to treat their own thought as an object of analysis. A younger child cannot say “I thought this because...”; an adolescent can.

Self-esteem is also unstable at this age. Adolescents assemble their picture of themselves largely from external responses – marks, a teacher’s tone, the reactions of peers – and may therefore experience a minor failure as something that touches their personal worth. The cognitive approach teaches a separation here: the quality of a piece of work and the worth of the person are not the same thing. The distinction looks simple, yet its absence generates a large part of the emotional strain of adolescence.

The particular character of the academic lyceum environment must also be taken into account. Because entry is competitive, the student body is relatively homogeneous: almost everyone was a strong pupil before. The internal standard of comparison consequently rises sharply, and many students experience a decline in their relative standing, which has a marked effect on self-esteem. Second, the workload is high and sustained, so that fatigue becomes chronic rather than episodic. Third, the belief that examination results determine one’s future loads every assessment with additional weight.

The way failure is explained also plays a large part. A student who attributes a poor result to lack of ability sees no point in further effort, since ability is taken to be fixed. A student who attributes the same result to a faulty method of preparation changes the direction of that effort. The difference lies not in the event but in the explanation. This is one of the most productive sites for cognitive work, and in lyceum conditions it arises almost weekly.

The combined effect of these three factors produces what is known as test anxiety. Its mechanism is well documented: anxious thoughts occupy part of working memory, reducing the cognitive resource available for the task. A student may therefore perform poorly not because of ignorance but because of anxiety. At this point the question of emotional intelligence becomes directly a question of attainment.

One further aspect should not be overlooked. Anxiety is not in itself the enemy. Moderate arousal sharpens attention and improves performance; the trouble begins when arousal draws attention away from the task and onto itself. Instead of thinking about the problem, the student thinks about their pounding heart, their shaking hands and what will happen if they fail. The aim, then, is not to eliminate anxiety but to keep it at a level that does not distract from the task – which is precisely the business of the cognitive approach.

What should be understood by developing emotional intelligence? If the four-branch model is taken as the framework, the answer becomes reasonably concrete, since each branch has its own skill and its own exercise.

A natural question arises here: if the four branches are abilities, can they be taught at all? The word ability is often understood to mean an innate characteristic. In psychology the term is used differently: an ability is a potential that changes with practice but, unlike knowledge, is manifested in performance. Skill at chess works in the same way – it develops through practice. Emotional intelligence follows the same logic, and it is for this reason that it can be made the object of teaching.

The first branch is perceiving and identifying emotion. In practical terms this means expanding the emotional vocabulary. Most adolescents describe their state with three words: good, bad, normal. Yet behind “bad” may lie resentment, envy, shame, fatigue or hurt, and each of these calls for a different response. The ability to name emotions precisely is known as emotional differentiation, and research indicates that people who possess it in a high degree cope better with emotional strain. The exercises are simple: keeping a journal, labelling the state with a precise term, noticing bodily signs.

The second branch is using emotion to facilitate thought. This branch is often neglected, although it is the most immediately practical for study. Different moods suit different tasks: an elevated state is well suited to generating ideas and to free writing, while a more sober and measured state suits checking for errors and work that demands precision. Students can be taught to plan their day on this logic. It sounds obvious, but it is rarely done.

The third branch is understanding emotion – knowing its causes, its trajectory and the ways in which it changes. It is here that the contribution of the cognitive approach is greatest. The ABC scheme, the identification of automatic thoughts and the study of common cognitive distortions all belong to this branch. The student begins to see that the conclusion “I have no aptitude for this subject” is in fact a generalisation drawn

from a single poor mark. Literature and history lessons supply ready material for this work: analysing the emotional state of a character in a novel is safer for a student than analysing their own, and therefore easier.

The fourth branch is managing emotion, and here the principal instrument is cognitive reappraisal. Teaching it proceeds through several steps: identifying the state, articulating the interpretation that produced it, searching for alternative interpretations, selecting the one that best fits the evidence, and observing the result. At the outset the work is done in writing; later it moves into inner speech. One condition is essential: the alternative interpretation must be accurate. The phrase “everything will be fine” is not reappraisal but denial. Reappraisal means seeing the situation more fully and more precisely.

A practical lesson might run as follows. The teacher presents the class with a familiar situation: a student has received a lower mark than expected. A three-column table is then drawn up – event, thought, feeling. Students write their own versions, which are read aloud. It usually emerges that a single event has produced something like ten different thoughts and correspondingly different feelings. Only then does the teacher ask the question: which of these thoughts best fits the evidence? The discussion is built around that question. The whole activity fits into forty minutes and requires no separate subject.

The influence of the peer group must also be taken into account. In adolescence the judgement of peers carries more weight than that of adults, so emotional skills are better formed in a group than individually. Group discussion performs two functions at once: the student sees that their interpretation is not the only one available, and practises understanding the experience of others. The second of these bears directly on empathy.

Another form of work with the peer group is mutual analysis. When students place their differing appraisals of the same situation side by side, the contingency of appraisal becomes evident without further comment. A teacher’s explanation is rarely as persuasive as that comparison, since an adolescent accepts a peer’s view more readily than an adult’s.

As to how these four strands should be organised, two answers are possible. The first is to introduce a separate course or training programme. The second is to embed the work in existing subjects and in extracurricular activity. The meta-analytic evidence favours the second. A study covering two hundred and thirteen school programmes found that social and emotional learning raised achievement by an average of eleven percentile points, but that this effect was observed chiefly where the programme was integrated consistently into the curriculum and delivered by teachers (Durlak et al., 2011:417). Later follow-up showed that the effect persisted over several years (Taylor et al., 2017:1165).

In lyceum conditions there are several concrete points of entry. Literature lessons offer natural ground for analysing the emotional motives of a character's conduct. In history, one can discuss the appraisal on which a historical figure's decision rested. Native and foreign language lessons lend themselves to exercises in the precise expression of emotional states. Psychology and ethics provide the theoretical frame; the form tutor's hours allow room for practical exercise; and a dedicated block of preparation before examinations is advisable.

The organisational side of the lesson is not a trivial matter either. There is no need to set aside a full period for this work; five minutes at the end of a lesson will often do. What matters is regularity. A short but consistent weekly exercise is more effective than a long monthly session, because skills are consolidated through repetition.

The teacher's role requires separate comment. Emotional skills are acquired mainly through example. A teacher who reacts irritably to error will not form a habit of reappraisal in the class, whatever theoretical material is covered. Teacher preparation is therefore not a technical precondition of this work but a substantive one, and such preparation cannot be confined to a short seminar: it must include the teacher's own work on their own emotional experience.

The weight of the digital environment in the emotional life of contemporary adolescents should also be recognised. Social media offer unlimited opportunities for comparison, and the comparison is usually made in a direction unfavourable to oneself. For a lyceum student this adds an external layer of competition on top of the internal one. It would be a mistake to avoid the subject in cognitive work: the selective character of such comparison – the fact that platforms display outcomes without the processes that led to them – provides very convenient material for discussion.

One more consideration belongs here. Skills of this kind generalise poorly when they are taught in isolation from content. A student who has practised reappraisal only on invented examples will not necessarily apply it the morning after a disappointing mark. Transfer has to be planned rather than assumed, which is a further argument for locating the work inside ordinary lessons: the situations that arise there are real, and the skill is rehearsed in the setting where it will actually be needed.

A word on the stages of the work. In the first stage an initial diagnostic assessment is carried out, the purpose of which is not to grade but to record a baseline. In the second, the main formative work is conducted, distributed across the school year and embedded in subject teaching. In the third, consolidation takes place, with students taught to transfer the acquired skill to new situations. The final measurement must use the same instruments as the initial diagnosis; otherwise comparison loses its meaning.

We come now to the most delicate issue, that of assessment. Three families of instrument are available for measuring emotional intelligence. The first consists of performance-based tests, of which the MSCEIT and its youth version are the best

known (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2003:99). Their advantage is that they measure ability rather than knowledge; their drawback is that the criterion of correctness rests on expert consensus and is sensitive to cultural context. The second consists of self-report questionnaires, which are convenient and quick but open to the effects of social desirability. The third consists of observation and teacher rating, where the information comes from an external source but subjectivity remains.

Assessment presents a further serious difficulty. After a programme in emotional intelligence, students' questionnaire scores almost always rise. That rise may indicate a genuine increase in skill, or merely that the relevant terminology has been learned. In the second case the student knows the right answer but does not apply it in a real situation. The only reliable way of reducing this risk is to compare questionnaire results with behavioural data.

None of these instruments is sufficient on its own, and assessment must therefore rest on triangulation. It is also useful, in determining the effect of an intervention, to track not only emotional intelligence scores but indirect outcomes as well: levels of anxiety before examinations, absence from lessons, the number of conflicts, the frequency with which students ask for help. These secondary indicators sometimes yield more trustworthy information than a test score.

The question of cultural adaptation cannot be set aside either. Norms governing the expression of emotion are culture-dependent. An answer marked as correct in a test item developed on Western samples may appear inappropriate in another cultural setting. Uzbek possesses a rich vocabulary for emotional states, but its transposition into psychological terminology has not been completed. Instruments therefore require substantive adaptation and revalidation rather than simple translation.

There is a further technical condition in adapting instruments. The internal consistency and factor structure of a translated questionnaire must be re-examined on a local sample; reliance on the figures reported for the original is not sufficient. This requirement is frequently overlooked, with the result that it remains unclear what the instrument is actually measuring.

There is also the matter of the wider climate of the institution. If marks are the only recognised value, if error is treated as something shameful, and if the teaching staff themselves work under continuous strain, no sequence of exercises will produce the intended effect. Emotional habits are learned from daily relationships rather than from programmes, and work with students therefore has to proceed alongside work with the teaching body.

The limitations of the approach should also be stated openly. Zeidner and colleagues noted that the evidence for teaching emotional intelligence in schools is in many cases weaker than expected, and that programme effects vary sharply according to the measure employed (Zeidner, Roberts & Matthews, 2002:230). That caution has not lost its force.

A second limitation belongs to the cognitive approach itself. Emphasising the regulation of feeling through thought can lead to excessive rationalisation. A student may become accustomed to analysing every experience and, instead of living through an emotion, turn it into a permanent object of scrutiny – which becomes a new source of strain in its own right. Cognitive techniques should therefore be balanced by other resources: attention to bodily state, physical activity, creative work.

The third limitation concerns boundaries. Although cognitive techniques derive from psychotherapy, the teacher is not a psychotherapist. If signs of serious emotional disturbance appear in a student, the task is to refer them to a specialist. Drawing this boundary clearly serves the interests of student and teacher alike.

Individual differences should not be overlooked either. The same programme does not affect all students equally. Those with low initial scores usually gain most, while the effect on students already scoring highly is less marked. Introverted and extraverted students also respond differently to group discussion, so written and oral formats are best used together. It is for these reasons that the programme should be planned flexibly rather than to a single template.

Written work has a special place here. In oral discussion an adolescent often defends themselves and withholds what they actually think; in writing they address themselves. Short daily entries – three or four sentences – therefore yield more trustworthy material than group conversation, and constitute a safer format for the student as well.

Finally, the role of the family. Students spend a substantial part of the day at home, and the relationships prevailing there may either reinforce or undo a skill formed at the lyceum. Work with parents should accordingly be planned as a component of the system rather than as an addition to it.

CONCLUSION

The emotional experience of an academic lyceum student cannot be considered in isolation from their academic results. Since high demands, constant comparison and examination pressure have become the normal conditions of study at this age, how a student thinks and feels under those conditions falls squarely within the responsibility of the education system. It is at this point that emotional intelligence ceases to be an educational slogan and becomes a set of skills that can be measured and developed.

The value of the cognitive approach in this work lies in its precision. If emotion arises from the appraisal placed upon an event, then changing the appraisal changes the emotional response – and that is a process which can be taught, practised and observed. The combination of the ability model with appraisal theory therefore offers the most workable theoretical basis for practical intervention. Each of the four branches acquires its own exercise: expanding the emotional vocabulary, matching mood to type of task, analysing cause and effect, and cognitive reappraisal.

The period from fifteen to eighteen has not been chosen at random. The fact that executive functions are still developing makes this age difficult, but it is the same fact that makes it responsive. And because abstract reasoning has already matured, students are able to examine their own thinking, which at a younger age is scarcely possible.

The most important practical conclusion concerns organisational form. Rather than conducting separate training sessions, it is considerably more effective to embed the work in literature, history, language and psychology lessons and in the activity of the form tutor. In such an arrangement the teacher remains the principal instrument, and their own emotional conduct matters no less than the content being taught. Even the most carefully designed programme will fail in the hands of an unprepared teacher.

At the same time the expected result should not be overstated. The evidence in this field is uneven, the measurement instruments are imperfect, and cultural adaptation remains work still to be done. The cognitive approach itself, if pressed too far, risks teaching students to analyse emotion permanently instead of experiencing it. The limits of the teacher's competence must also be clearly drawn, since serious emotional disturbance calls for clinical rather than pedagogical help.

Two tasks accordingly stand first among the next steps in this line of work. One is to develop a performance-based instrument in Uzbek and to examine its psychometric properties on a sample of lyceum students. The other is to trial the proposed model against a control group and to evaluate its effect not through questionnaire scores alone but through actual academic outcomes and observational data. Until such testing is carried out, any methodological proposal remains at the level of theoretical justification and provides insufficient grounds for wide implementation.

Taken as a whole, work on emotional intelligence in the academic lyceum is not an additional burden on an already heavy curriculum but the means by which that burden becomes bearable. A student who can name their state, identify its cause and find in themselves an alternative way of seeing the situation does not encounter fewer difficulties – they simply experience them differently. The most pressing direction for future research is not theoretical but empirical: the creation of measurement instruments adapted to national conditions, and long-term experimental testing of the proposed system of work with a control group.

REFERENCES

1. Bar-On, R. (1997). *The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Technical Manual*. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.
2. Beck, A. T. (1976). *Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders*. New York: International Universities Press.
3. Blakemore, S.-J., & Choudhury, S. (2006). Development of the adolescent brain: Implications for executive function and social cognition. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 47(3–4), 296–312.

4. Brackett, M. A., Rivers, S. E., & Salovey, P. (2011). Emotional intelligence: Implications for personal, social, academic, and workplace success. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 5(1), 88–103.
5. Casey, B. J., Jones, R. M., & Hare, T. A. (2008). The adolescent brain. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1124, 111–126.
6. Durlak, J. A., Weissberg, R. P., Dymnicki, A. B., Taylor, R. D., & Schellinger, K. B. (2011). The impact of enhancing students' social and emotional learning: A meta-analysis of school-based universal interventions. *Child Development*, 82(1), 405–432.
7. Ellis, A. (1962). *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy*. New York: Lyle Stuart.
8. Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ*. New York: Bantam Books.
9. Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(3), 271–299.
10. Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion regulation: Current status and future prospects. *Psychological Inquiry*, 26(1), 1–26.
11. Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and Adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, Appraisal, and Coping*. New York: Springer.
13. MacCann, C., Jiang, Y., Brown, L. E. R., Double, K. S., Bucich, M., & Minbashian, A. (2020). Emotional intelligence predicts academic performance: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 146(2), 150–186.
14. Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & D. Sluyter (Eds.), *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence* (pp. 3–31). New York: Basic Books.
15. Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2003). Measuring emotional intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0. *Emotion*, 3(1), 97–105.
16. Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R., & Salovey, P. (2016). The ability model of emotional intelligence: Principles and updates. *Emotion Review*, 8(4), 290–300.
17. Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 9(5), 242–249.
18. Petrides, K. V., & Furnham, A. (2001). Trait emotional intelligence: Psychometric investigation with reference to established trait taxonomies. *European Journal of Personality*, 15(6), 425–448.
19. Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, 9(3), 185–211.
20. Scherer, K. R. (2009). The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model. *Cognition and Emotion*, 23(7), 1307–1351.
21. Steinberg, L. (2005). Cognitive and affective development in adolescence. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 9(2), 69–74.
22. Taylor, R. D., Oberle, E., Durlak, J. A., & Weissberg, R. P. (2017). Promoting positive youth development through school-based social and emotional learning interventions: A meta-analysis of follow-up effects. *Child Development*, 88(4), 1156–1171.
23. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24. Zeidner, M., Roberts, R. D., & Matthews, G. (2002). Can emotional intelligence be schooled? A critical review. *Educational Psychologist*, 37(4), 215–231.
25. Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. PF-158 of 11 September 2023 “On the Uzbekistan – 2030 Strategy”. Tashkent, 2023.
26. Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. PF-5712 of 29 April 2019 “On approval of the Concept for the Development of the Public Education System of the Republic of Uzbekistan until 2030”. Tashkent, 2019.